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The Making of Dangerous Communities: 
The “Peul-Fouta” in Ebola-Weary Senegal 
Ato Kwamena Onoma 
Abstract: Epidemics of contagious diseases often motivate the social 
constitution of “dangerous communities.” These communities are de-
fined as having a high potential to further spread the diseases involved to 
a wider public. Migrant communities’ links with sick people in places of 
origin that are badly affected by such diseases ostensibly justify the con-
struction of these communities as epidemic dangers to their places of 
residence. But this depiction of certain groups as health threats is always 
grounded in other long-standing narratives about the populations tar-
geted. Such narratives often portray those targeted as radically different 
from the wider body politic and stigmatise them in multiple ways. The 
situation of the Peul of Guinean origin in Senegal at the height of the 
Ebola virus disease outbreak in the Mano River Basin sheds light on 
these processes of sociogenesis and their implications for epidemic con-
trol and prevention. 
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We were afraid of the Peul-Fouta and tried to stay away from 
them during the Ebola epidemic. People said the Peul-Fouta 
will bring Ebola to Senegal.1  
 
Epidemics of contagious diseases often motivate the construction of 
dangerous communities that are portrayed as likely to cause the spread of 
diseases in the general populace. When migrants’ places of origin are 
severely hit by epidemics, links with these “home” areas are said to jus-
tify the constitution of such migrant populations as health threats to 
their places of residence. The Peul community of Guinean origin in 
Senegal, popularly known as “Peul-Fouta,”2 was constituted as such an 
epidemic danger during the Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in the 
Mano River Basin.  
The EVD outbreak that started in December 2013 turned out to be 
much worse than was initially expected in the three most affected coun-
tries of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. It reached epidemic propor-
tions and the World Health Organization (WHO) declared it a “public 
health emergency of international concern” in August 2014 (Onoma 
2016). The epidemic resulted in over 28,000 cases and more than 11,300 
deaths in the three countries. It also caused much damage to the health 
systems and economies in these countries, which were still recovering 
from the ravages of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars of the 
1990s and the first decade of this century (Bartone 2016; WHO Ebola 
Response Team 2016). It spread beyond the rural confines to which 
EVD outbreaks in Central and Eastern Africa had previously been 
limited to highly populated urban centres. The disease led to much fear 
and anxiety, partly fuelled by the emphasis on the incurable nature of the 
disease in many early sensitisation messages. This fear led to many pre-
ventable deaths from other diseases as many tried to stay away from 
health centres in a bid to avoid being infected with EVD. Fear also en-
couraged the stigmatisation of both the sick and the health workers who 
helped tackle the disease in these countries (Onoma 2016).  
Beyond the three worst-affected countries, infection chains oc-
curred in Mali, Nigeria, the United States, and Spain, in addition to a case 
in Senegal. Despite warnings to the contrary from health experts, travel 
1  Interview with a Senegalese person in Point E, Dakar, 14 February 2016.  
2  Because of the need to repeatedly use the terms “Peul-Fouta” and “Senegalese” in 
this article, I often employ them without the quotation marks they deserve. Much 
of this article is, however, dedicated to problematising these categories. In cit-
ations of interviews, I use the term “Senegalo-Guinean,” which some members of 
this community use to describe themselves.  
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and visa restrictions were deployed around the world as many scrambled 
to keep the disease at bay (Onoma 2016). 
This article addresses two questions: Why was the Peul-Fouta com-
munity imagined as a health menace to Senegal at the height of the EVD 
outbreak? And why did the danger that this community supposedly 
posed to Senegal largely go unrealised? The responses to these questions 
invoke the centrality of sociological processes to epidemics and the con-
tinuities between the “exceptional” periods of epidemics and broader 
social dynamics. The study coincides with many in arguing that under-
standing epidemics requires making sense of society writ large (M’bokolo 
1982: 21; Farmer 1999: 5, 2005: 30; Edmond 2006; Echenberg 2011; 
Bangura 2014; Niang 2014; Faye 2015).  
In Senegal, the social life of the epidemic involved the construction 
of the Peul-Fouta community as a serious health threat. It was believed 
that frequent travel between Guinea and Senegal by Peul-Fouta and their 
Guinean relatives and business partners would lead to the spread of 
EVD from Guinea to Senegal.3 This idea coincided with the often-
espoused connection between migration and the spread of contagious 
diseases (Aagaard-Hansen, Nombela, and Alvar 2010). It was asserted 
that Peul-Fouta who travelled to Guinea would catch EVD there and 
bring the disease to Senegal. There was also the idea that infected Guine-
ans who were not yet showing symptoms would travel to Senegal to visit 
Peul-Fouta relatives and infect people.4 But movements between the two 
countries and contact between Peul-Fouta and Guineans before the 
epidemic could not justify the portrayal of the Peul-Fouta as an epidemic 
danger. These movements and connections could have caused the spread 
of EVD only if the Peul-Fouta did not alter their behaviour in reaction 
to the epidemic. The complementary assumption about Peul-Fouta un-
willingness to change in a time of an epidemic is rooted in popular im-
aginaries in Senegalese society about “how the Peul-Fouta are.” These 
imaginaries are part of the long-standing process of constructing “Sene-
galese” and “Peul-Fouta” communities that are said to have sharply 
contrasting attitudes and behaviours. The EVD epidemic became im-
mersed in and can only be understood with reference to histories of 
social differentiation, marginalisation, and struggles over belonging in 
Senegal. The fact that, contrary to these narratives, Senegalese and Peul-
Fouta reacted in similar ways to the epidemic sheds light on why the 
threat that the Peul-Fouta ostensibly posed to Senegal never materialised.  
3  Interviews with Senegalese people in Point E, Dakar, 14 February 2016, 23 March 
2016, and 24 March 2016. 
4  Interview with a Senegalese person in Point E, Dakar, 14 February 2016. 
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This article is based on participant observation and long semi-struc-
tured interviews with 18 “Peul-Fouta” and 15 “Senegalese” in Dakar. The 
interviews took place in the neighbourhoods of Point E, Parcelles Assain-
ies, Guediawaye, and Pikine. Interviewees ranged from scholars and staff 
of research institutions to store owners and wayside vendors. They all fell 
between the ages of 23 and 70. Men constituted 19 of the interviewees, 
and women 14.  
Informal conversations with nine Peul-Fouta and over 20 Senegalese 
also significantly influenced this study. The Peul-Fouta who I held these 
conversations with included academics, NGO workers, taxi drivers, fruit 
sellers, and store operators. The Senegalese who participated in these con-
versations included NGO workers, civil society members, state officials, 
professors, and domestic workers. Informed verbal consent was obtained 
from all participants before all formal interviews and informal conversa-
tions. Unlike the Senegalese, many Peul-Fouta refused to take part in the 
study and being too busy was one of the main reasons they gave for this. 
Formal interviews and informal conversations were conducted from Feb-
ruary to April 2016.  
Insights into Senegalese attitudes and concerns were boosted by the 
exploration of online sources. These sources were often less useful for 
gauging the views of Peul-Fouta, since xenophobic outbursts cowed 
many into assuming a low profile at the height of the epidemic. Living in 
Dakar during the epidemic also contributed to my interest in this subject 
and shaped my perspectives on it. 
The rest of this article is divided into four sections. The next seg-
ment clarifies key concepts and provides some theoretical grounding for 
the argument. This is followed by a section that uses empirical evidence 
from Senegal to support my argument. I then place this argument in a 
broader context that goes beyond EVD and West Africa. The conclusion 
teases out a few policy implications of the work. 5 
5  I wish to thank Aissatou Sow for research assistance. Emiliane Faye provided 
very helpful library assistance. Mamay Jah and Mame Sokhna Thiare read and 
commented on an earlier draft of this article. Sylvain Landry Faye gave very in-
sightful comments on a draft of the paper as the discussant during my presen-
tation of the paper at a CODESRIA seminar. I wish to thank all of these col-
leagues and other participants at the CODESRIA seminar for their input, 
which has made this article better. 
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Conceptual and Theoretical Considerations 
The portrayal of a community as an epidemic danger is marked by an 
utter lack of concern for the welfare of such a population. It exclusively 
focuses on the supposed threat that a community poses to others with 
no concern about the well-being of that community in the first place. 
For migrant populations, it is links with home areas plagued by conta-
gious epidemics that have often led to their portrayal as health threats 
(Markel and Stern 2002; Eichelberger 2007; Harper and Raman 2008; 
White 2010). Contact with sick members of their “home” population, 
through trips “home” or through the entertainment of visitors from 
“home” are said to facilitate the spread of diseases. But histories of such 
interactions are insufficient bases for framing migrants as epidemiologi-
cally dangerous. For these links to contribute to the spread of disease, 
migrants have to continue to interact with the place of origin and the 
people there as they did before the start of the respective epidemic. In 
the case of EVD, this would mean physical contact with the sick at the 
height of a major epidemic. 
Such continuity would make migrants exceptional relative to others 
who are forced by epidemics and the fear they cause into making 
changes to their lifestyles and activities (M’bokolo 1982: 14–15; Nga-
lamulume 2004; Edmond 2006; Carpenter 2010: 511; Dumbuya 2015; 
Onoma 2016: 2;). This view of migrants as exceptional is an aspect of 
boundary making in inter-communal encounters through which certain 
populations are imagined as radically different from others (Caplan 1995; 
Jeyifo 2002; Nyamnjoh 2010: 60). These assumptions of sociological 
difference pervade encounters between so-called migrants and autoch-
thones. They often come to the fore during health crises and touch on 
fundamental questions of self-love, sociability, patriotism, and citizen-
ship (Edmond 2006; Echenberg 2007).  
The processes through which migrant and autochthonous communi-
ties are created and made to confront each other involve two moves that 
are both fundamentally negating (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000: 430; 
Jackson 2006: 95–123). The first fabricates two communities, each of which 
is portrayed as internally homogenous regardless of its many internal dif-
ferences. The second sharply distinguishes between these groups, imagin-
ing away whatever links may exist between them (Nyamnjoh 2015: 10). 
This process of othering can jump from defining a migrant com-
munity as a threat to a host area that they are a part of to defining them 
as not belonging to this place at all. Because strangers are a threat to the 
body politic, they are gradually defined out of this entity. But their defi-
nition as not/no longer part of the body politic only serves to magnify 
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the danger they pose, which further justifies their exclusion. Thus, com-
ments about their “invading our country” and there “being too many of 
them here” become common. From there it is a short step to calls for a 
census of the strangers, insistence that “they should all register,” and 
calls for them to only live in certain areas or for their expulsion 
(M’bokolo 1982: 33–34; HSRC 2008: 29–30; Roberts 2010: 348; Onoma 
2013; Bangura 2014).6 
The frequent use of “stranger,” “migrant,” “autochthon,” and “indi-
gene” in these discourses belies the complex and troubled histories of 
these concepts. The distinction of the autochthon from the stranger has 
come to emphasise origin in a territory, first arrival in a place, earlier arrival 
relative to others, and so on (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000; Konings 
2008; Jackson 2006; Onoma 2013). The evolving definitions of these con-
cepts are replete with ambiguity, and the concepts are often deliberately 
deployed in diverse ways to maximise advantage in political struggles 
(Jackson 2006; Geschiere 2009). The relevant entities juxtaposed range 
from ethnic groups and villages to clans and families (Onoma 2013). 
Often, citizenship rights, including those to land as well as the rights to 
vote and contest power in a place, are at the heart of these struggles. These 
conflicts have led to violent outbreaks and various forms of exclusion in 
many areas of the world (Mamdani 2001; Geschiere 2009; Onoma 2013). 
Landlord–stranger relations that facilitate the redistribution of rights, priv-
ileges, and costs in these societies while reinforcing hierarchies represent 
one mechanism through which these tensions are tempered (Onoma 2013; 
Bedert 2017).  
The deployment of stereotypes is a key part of the process through 
which populations constitute others as well as themselves in interactions 
between strangers and autochthones. Health and sanitation concerns 
often occupy pride of place in these processes of stereotyping, which 
also dwell on issues like noise making and the tolerance of noise, sexual 
morality, work ethic, and aggressiveness (Onoma 2013). Colonial offi-
cials in Africa and Asia often complained about the sanitary unwhole-
someness of “natives.” These concerns were sometimes implicated in 
settlement plans that separated zones for Europeans from those for 
African and Asian “natives” (Curtin 1985: 595–597; Goerg 1998: 13). In 
the 1990s, many refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone portrayed their 
Guinean hosts as insalubrious. Guineans in turn questioned the cleanli-
6  Suggestions for a register of Muslims already in the United States and measures to 
ban Muslims from entry into the country floated during the 2016 US presidential 
elections provide examples of these measures in the context of counter-terrorism.  
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ness of their refugee guests, with a particular focus on “fecal matters” 
(Onoma 2013: 121).  
The existence of mirroring portrayals is only one paradox of these 
processes of stereotyping. Another is the rather conflicting mix of cast-
iron certainty and insatiable uncertainty that characterises attitudes to the 
other. The strength of certainty is demonstrated in the stock phrases em-
ployed: “Batutsi are cunning and conniving people!” “The Zulu are natur-
ally bellicose!” “The Senegalese are lazy and loud-mouthed!” Assertions 
that do not permit exceptions, nuance, or doubt are typical. The brevity 
and tone of finality incarnate certitude, which is reinforced by the manner 
of delivery in spoken form. Structure, substance, and performance re-
inforce each other to posit a plenitude of certainty that raises questions as 
to whether they are only directed at the ears of the listener.  
The overdetermination of certainty in these deliveries suggests that 
an effort is being made to reassure the speaker as much as the listener. It 
betrays a gnawing sense of uncertainty and an insatiable curiosity about 
who “those people” are, what they represent, and what they are going to 
do (Hoffman 1986; Bauman 1997; Appadurai 1998). This curiosity is 
made all the more urgent by the fact that “those people” are changing 
over time just as “we” are. What we know always has the potential to 
become obsolete. This creates a perpetual crisis of uncertainty and 
doubt. Statements about how “those people” are or how “we” are be-
come efforts to grasp and ossify social categories that are constantly 
evolving. The urgency of grasping the other once and for all increases 
precisely because this task is ultimately impossible. When pursued to 
extremes, these Sisyphean efforts to “capture” and “fix” the other have 
sometimes led to murderous violence (Appadurai 1998). 
Some of the long-standing stereotypes that focus on how some 
people care little about their own well-being inform the idea that such 
populations will spread diseases by ignoring epidemic control and pre-
vention measures. Historical processes of constructing and policing 
differences during times of normality come to influence how people 
make sense of, adapt to, and shape the course of epidemics. Facing dan-
gerous outbreaks, people resort to long-held ideas and toolkits to fashion 
solutions and coping strategies. 
Narratives that portray certain populations as spreaders of diseases 
thrive even while members of the targeted groups are routinely seen to 
display behaviours that accord with epidemic control and prevention 
measures. Such behaviours are often not used to question popular under-
standings of these populations as health hazards. Instead, in a classic case 
of interpretation bias, facts are imagined and/or explained away to fit with 
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established views of these people (Resch, Ernst, and Garrow 2000: 164–
167; Kaptchuk 2003). 
These behaviours on the part of “dangerous” populations that ac-
cord with epidemic control and prevention measures help us understand 
why the health threats that these communities are said to pose often do 
not materialise. The constitution of these populations as epidemic dan-
gers is rooted in imaginaries that aid social differentiation and contests 
over rights of citizenship and belonging (Ogachi 1999: 83–107; Ge-
schiere and Nyamnjoh 2000; Jackson 2006: 95–123; Arnaut 2008: 1–20). 
But these imaginaries are of limited utility in helping one understand the 
variegated and evolving communities that constitute our diverse societies 
today (Nyamnjoh 2015: 10). They are also poor predictors of behaviour 
in the face of epidemics. 
Unravelling Senegal’s “Puzzling” Escape  
from the EVD Epidemic 
The Pulaar-speaking people, of whom the Peul-Fouta are a part, include 
nomadic pastoralists, sedentary cultivators, and city residents and are 
found in multiple countries in West, Central, and North Africa (Adebayo 
1991: 1; Oppong 2002: 28). In Senegal, the suffix “Fouta” serves to dis-
tinguish Peul migrants from Guinea from the Fulfulde-speaking Peul and 
Toucouleur of Senegal. It does so by connecting the Peul-Fouta to their 
supposed place of origin: the Fouta Djallon highlands of Guinea. Tying 
the Peul population to one place is problematic because the history of the 
Peul can above all be summarised as one of movement (Oppong 2002: 
37–39; Hampshire 2010). It is a good example of the much-denounced 
privileging of origins over place of residence (Mamdani 2001; Mbembe 
2002: 241).  
Contrary to the Senegalese tendency to speak of the Peul-Fouta as a 
homogenous group, this community is a highly diverse and evolving one 
in terms of traits such as age structure, profession, wealth, length of stay 
in Senegal, and ties to Guinea. Some Peul-Fouta arrived in Senegal re-
cently, while others migrated to Senegal decades ago. Some are high-level 
actors in the Senegalese civil service, security forces, and private sector, 
while others sell fruit, charcoal, and vegetables. While some maintain 
very strong links with Guinea, some were born in Senegal and have 
never been to Guinea (Lefebvre 2003: 4, 22; Diallo 2009: 74).  
Peul-Fouta routes to Senegal have always been varied. Today many 
travel between Guinea and Dakar via the highway that runs from Dakar 
through Tambacounda to the border post in Manda. On the Guinean side 
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of the border, the main road passes through many towns in the Fouta 
Djallon that are the destination or point of departure of many Peul-Fouta. 
Further south-west, one ends up in the Guinean capital, Conakry, which 
has heavy concentrations of Peul inhabitants. But since many Peul have 
for centuries lived in other areas of Guinea, it is not unusual for movement 
to involve other routes and destinations. Additionally, many Peul-Fouta 
first travel to countries like Sierra Leone and Gambia to seek a fortune and 
then later move to Senegal from these places.  
The Peul-Fouta community is the largest population of Guinean 
origin in Dakar (Bah, Keita, and Lootvoet 1989; Groelsema 1998; Diallo 
2009: 54). Difficult political relations with Guinea’s first president, Sékou 
Toure, motivated large-scale migration by the Peul to Senegal and other 
countries in the 1970s. Many flows have followed since. The heavy con-
centration of Peul-Fouta in Dakar, compared to the rest of Senegal, stems 
from the same factors that pull many Africans to cities. Dakar’s central 
role in the colonial French West African territories also means that it has 
long attracted migrants from francophone African countries and else-
where. This has made it a diverse city. Other notable “migrant” communi-
ties in Dakar include the Cape Verdians and Dahomeans (Benin). 
In Dakar, Peul-Fouta are very visible partly on account of the key 
roles they play in the retailing of fruits, vegetables, and charcoal, as well 
as the running of corner shops. Their participation in these businesses 
puts Peul-Fouta in constant touch with many Senegalese and has led to 
their deep association with these activities. One consequence of the 
identification of Peul-Fouta with these economic activities is that many 
overlook the other multiple roles they play – for instance, as academics, 
legal and medical practitioners, public servants, and state security per-
sonnel. Another consequence is the rather pervasive tendency of many 
Senegalese in Dakar to conflate being Peul-Fouta and being Guinean. 
People routinely use “les Peul-Fouta” and “les Guinéens” interchangeably. 
The Soussou, Malinké, and other groups originating from Guinea that 
live in Dakar are generally overlooked by many Senegalese in Dakar in 
their discussion of les Guinéens. Further, the fact that many Peul-Fouta 
were born in Senegal and are citizens of Senegal is elided by popular 
reference to them as “les Guinéens.” 
When a Peul-Fouta visitor from Guinea was diagnosed with EVD in 
August 2014 in Dakar, it only confirmed the long-held fears of many Sene-
galese that the Peul-Fouta would “bring Ebola to Senegal.” The focus on 
the Peul-Fouta, while rooted in the geography of this specific outbreak, 
also reflected the common preoccupation with elsewhere and with others 
as the source of diseases (Ngalamulume 2004: 198; Eichelberger 2007; 
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Mason 2012). The usual effort to exorcise “foreign” threats went into full 
gear. On phone-in radio shows and online, people expressed fear of the 
Peul-Fouta and urged their policing, isolation, and expulsion.7 People were 
warned to avoid buying food that could not be washed from the Peul-
Fouta. Those who had to buy vegetables from the Peul-Fouta were told to 
thoroughly wash these foods with antiseptic liquid.8 Some avoided sitting 
next to Peul-Fouta on public transport vehicles, and people yelled “Ebola” 
at Peul-Fouta in the streets.9 A demonstration in Dakar against the hospi-
talisation of the Guinean EVD patient at Hopital Fann had to be violently 
dispersed by the security forces. Vigilante groups from border villages ar-
rested and handed Guineans crossing the border over to security person-
nel for deportation (Ba 2014). 
This stigmatisation unfortunately blemished a much broader effort 
spearheaded by the minister of health and social action, Prof. Awa Marie 
Coll Seck, who won great plaudits for her professionalism and effective-
ness. In May 2014, as EVD spread in neighbouring Guinea, the Ministry 
of Health and Social Action of Senegal published an action plan to deal 
with the epidemic (Desclaux and Sow 2015). Sensitisation on the dan-
gers, signs, and symptoms of EVD and on measures for controlling and 
preventing the spread of the disease, pervaded audio, video, and print 
media, with billboards erected in various areas of the city. The border 
with Guinea was closed twice, with reinforced policing to prevent 
crossing to and from Guinea (Onoma 2016). To aid interventions by 
international health agencies working in the affected countries, Senegal 
allowed for the establishment of an air bridge for the passage of human 
and material resources to fight the epidemic. A system of monitoring was 
put in place for people stationed in Senegal who visited the Mano River 
Basin countries. When the young Guinean was diagnosed with EVD, an 
elaborate system of contact tracing was deployed, followed by the quar-
antining and monitoring of all contacts for a 21-day period (Desclaux 
and Sow 2015). 
But expectations about the spread of the disease in Senegal and 
other countries bordering the three worst-affected countries largely went 
unrealised. The young Peul-Fouta seemed to have been the only EVD 
sufferer that had crossed into Senegal. He recovered from the disease 
and did not cause a chain of infection. Two of the three other countries 
7  Interviews with Senegalese people in Point E, Dakar, 23 March 2016 and 24 
March 2016. 
8  Interview with a Senegalese person in Point E, Dakar, 24 March 2016. 
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bordering the Mano River Basin – Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea Bissau – 
had no EVD cases. Mali had two chains of infection that were contained 
(WHO 2014; Le Monde 2015).  
The Insufficiency of Links to a Place of Sick Bodies 
The link between the Peul-Fouta and EVD-ravaged Guinea was only part 
of the reason why people saw the former as an epidemic danger. The fear 
was grounded in the belief that unlike “the Senegalese,” the Peul-Fouta 
would not alter their behaviour in response to the EVD outbreak. This 
belief is evident in the two ways in which people thought the disease 
would spread: (1) Peul-Fouta would continue their frequent trips to 
Guinea, where they would become infected and return to spread EVD in 
Senegal; and (2) Peul-Fouta would continue to host recurrent visitors from 
Guinea who might have EVD and infect people in Senegal.10 People were 
thus asserting Peul-Fouta peculiarity as the people who would continue 
normal lives in the face of an epidemic that forced many to change their 
behaviour. These changes included avoiding handshaking, washing hands 
frequently, postponing trips, and cancelling conferences. 
This idea of Peul-Fouta peculiarity has to be understood as part of a 
long-standing process of boundary making in Dakar that distinguishes 
between the “Peul-Fouta” and the “Senegalese.” This distinction be-
tween Peul-Fouta and Senegalese is only one boundary-making process 
in the diverse city of Dakar. Another pits the Senegalese against nyaks, a 
category of foreigners that does not include whites, Asians, and people 
from Senegal’s neighbours (Nyamnjoh 2005). The dominance of the 
Peul-Fouta–Senegalese distinction during the EVD crisis was rooted in 
the fact that Guinea was badly affected by the epidemic. These processes 
of differentiation ignore the significant diversity within each of these 
groups as well as the links that exist between these communities.  
In Senegal the idea of Peul-Fouta peculiarity is grounded above all 
else in the understanding of the group as singularly obsessed with accu-
mulating wealth,11 evoking discourses on Jews (Muller 2010). Something 
that is said to follow from this stereotype is their total lack of considera-
tion for personal well-being, as seen in their habit of spending as little as 
they can on food. “A Peul-Fouta will buy rice and maafe for CFA 500 
(USD 1), eat it for lunch, dinner and even leave some of it for breakfast 
11  Interviews with Senegalese people in Point E, Dakar, 24 March 2016 and in Golf-
Sud, Guediewaye, Dakar, 30 April 2016.  
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the next day!”12 Another supposed implication is their disregard for per-
sonal comfort, as seen in their accommodation arrangements.  
A [Peul-Fouta] man and his three wives and their 10 children can 
all live in a little room. It could be a room like this with a bed on 
one side and a curtain to separate the TV area. The wife whose 
turn it is to sleep with the husband will join him on the bed while 
the rest sleep in the other area. They do that because they are 
stingy. They have money but would rather live in crowded condi-
tions like that.13 
This stinginess is said to have sanitary implications, recalling colonial anx-
ieties over the insalubrity of indigenes (M’bokolo 1982: 15–16; Goerg 
1998: 8-10; Ngalamulume 2004: 191).  
The Peul-Fouta are not very clean people. Can you imagine that 
their little shop is also where they live? They will not rent a place 
to live in. That is where they will sleep. They will also cook there. 
They will use it as their toilet and everything else. And then they 
will also sell bread and other foods to us there. That is why people 
sometimes hesitate to buy things you cannot cook or wash before 
eating from them.14 
In these discourses, the extent to which the qualities ascribed to the Peul-
Fouta – such as habitation in cramped conditions and a focus on saving – 
are shared by other migrant groups and even some Senegalese is ignored. 
So is the question of whether some Peul-Fouta have lifestyles that differ 
from those ascribed to the group (Lefebvre 2003: 15).  
Similar stereotyping of the Peul proliferates across West and Central 
Africa. In Ghana the Peul are portrayed as armed robbers, bandits, and 
rapists. They are also seen as dirty and backward (Bukari and Schareika 
2015: 4–8). There may be something of the envy with which “civilised” 
sedentary communities look at herdsmen who live on the margins of 
“civilised” society, where they often defy the state and its impositions 
(Scott 2009). 
The Unexceptional “Peul-Fouta” 
Contrary to popular perceptions, interviews with Peul-Fouta revealed how 
similar their outlooks and preoccupations regarding EVD were to others in 
12  Interview with a Senegalese person in Point E, Dakar, 24 March 2016. 
13  Interview with a Senegalese person in Point E, Dakar, 23 March 2016. 
14  Interview with a Senegalese person in Point E, Dakar, 23 March 2016. 
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Senegal and beyond. As was the case for most people, the height of the 
outbreak was a time of great fear and stress for Peul-Fouta.15 They agon-
ised over the spread of EVD in Guinea and the damage it was causing 
there. They were also concerned about the damage the disease would 
cause if it spread in Senegal and the xenophobic backlash from the Sene-
galese that would result.16 As one person noted, “If Ebola comes here it is 
everyone that will be affected.”17  
Like many in West Africa and the rest of the world, the Peul-Fouta 
adopted behavioural changes to shield themselves and their loved ones 
from the disease. Many interviewees reported a general reduction in 
movement between Guinea and Senegal during the period, with people 
limiting travel to “essential” trips.18 One interviewee noted,  
At the height of Ebola we were afraid of going to Guinea. Ebola 
was very contagious and killed many people quickly. People were 
already limiting their travel to Guinea because of the disease even 
before the border was closed.19  
There was an effort to accomplish tasks without travel to Guinea, and 
business people began to rely more on goods from other areas during 
the period.20 
Peul-Fouta also tried to manage visits to Senegal by Guineans. At 
the height of the outbreak, calls from Guineans to potential hosts con-
cerning planned trips to Senegal inevitably turned to the question of 
EVD and its implications for travel. Peul-Fouta would discuss the EVD 
outbreak with would-be travellers from Guinea and inform them of the 
tense environment in Senegal as well as the border closure (when it did 
happen). They would explain to their would-be guests the dangers of 
travel given the possibility of contagion. Many Peul-Fouta counselled 
travellers to either cancel or put off trips that were not deemed abso-
lutely essential.21 A Peul-Fouta person noted,  
15  Interviews with Senegalo-Guineans in Pikine Nord, Dakar, 13 February 2016; 
in Pikine Tally Boumack, Dakar, 14 February 2016; and in Guediawaye, Dakar, 
17 February 2016. 
16  Interviews with Senegalo-Guineans in Pikine Gounass, Dakar, 24 March 2016; 
in Point E, Dakar, 6 April 2016; and in Thiaroye Gare, Dakar, 26 March 2016. 
17  Interview with a Senegalo-Guinean in Pikine Nord, Dakar, 13 March 2016. 
18  Interview with a Senegalo-Guinean in Thiaroye Gare, Dakar, 26 March 2016. 
19  Interview with a Senegalo-Guinean in Point E, Dakar, 6 April 2016. 
20  Interviews with Senegalo-Guineans in Guediawaye, Dakar, 17 February 2016 
and in Parcelles Assainies, Dakar, 20 Feburary 2016.  
21  Interviews with Senegalo-Guineans in Pikine Tally Boumack, Dakar, 14 Febru-
ary and 23 February 2016. 
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After the start of Ebola we started talking to people who wanted 
to visit us from Guinea about health issues and the risks of 
spreading the disease. We told people to postpone their travel 
because of Ebola in Guinea.22  
The comments of another revealed the anxieties of the time in more detail.  
No one from our family went to Guinea then. And no one from 
Guinea came to visit us at that time […] I don’t know if my dad 
discouraged them from coming or if they just did not want to 
come here at that time. If my dad had told us someone was com-
ing from Guinea to stay with us I would have said “No.” It was 
not safe.23 
The statement of a Senegalese person who has Peul-Fouta neighbours 
lends support to the general trend towards limited movement between 
the two countries during this period.  
We have Peul-Fouta neighbours that we interact with a lot. Dur-
ing that time I did not see any new person in their house. There 
were people there who wanted to go back to Guinea but they 
could not. They were scared to go back. 24 
Where trips were deemed essential, further details on the health history 
and contacts of the traveller were discussed with the goal of preventing 
the possible contamination of the host’s family.25  
The suspension of normality by Peul-Fouta continued after the arri-
val of visitors. Some interviewees reported closely watching guests so as 
to detect any possible signs of EVD-like symptoms.26  
We were afraid of them bringing the disease and contaminating 
us. For those who came we started to look carefully at their 
health. This is not something we used to do before Ebola. We did 
not want them to contaminate our household members if they fell 
sick. We did not tell them to isolate themselves, but if they fell 
sick we told them to go to the hospital.27 
The nuanced measures adopted by the Peul-Fouta of reducing non-
essential travel and checking the health history of travellers were proced-
22  Interview with a Senegalo-Guinean in Guediawaye, Dakar, 28 March 2016. 
23  Interview with a Senegalo-Guinean in Point E, Dakar, 6 April 2016. 
24  Interview with a Senegalese person in Point E, Dakar, 23 March 2016. 
25  Interview with a Senegalo-Guinean in Guediawaye, Dakar, 17 February 2016.  
26  Interview with a Senegalo-Guinean in Pikine Nord, Dakar, 13 February 2016. 
27  Interview with a Senegalo-Guinean in Pikine Nord, Dakar, 13 February 2016. 
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ures recommended by agencies involved in fighting the outbreak (WHO 
2014; Friedman 2014; MacKenzie 2014; Onoma 2016). These stand in 
contrast with many of the brash measures adopted by states that went 
against the counsel of these agencies and were not always productive. 
The closure of Senegal’s border in March and again in August 2014 was an 
example. It raised the cost of travel between the two countries and dis-
couraged “unnecessary travel.”28 But people who really wanted to travel 
just circumvented the barriers, as many migrants do around the world 
(Locoh 1989: 21–22; Fall 1995: 271; Lombard 2009: 242; Mackenzie 2014). 
The use of unmanned border points and air travel through third countries 
facilitated such movements.29 A “Bootlegger-Baptist” dynamic (Yandle 
1983) developed, with some clamouring for the closure of the border to 
curb crossings while others exploited the closure to smuggle people across 
the border for a fee.30 By motivating people to use unmanned crossing 
points, the border closure took away the ability of health authorities to 
conduct health checks on travellers (Mackenzie 2014).  
Given the measures taken by the Peul-Fouta, it is unsurprising that 
the feared arrival of asymptomatic hordes of EVD-contaminated people 
in Senegal from Guinea did not come to pass.  
Beyond Senegal and the Mano River Basin 
EVD outbreak 
The construction of the Peul-Fouta as epidemiologically dangerous re-
sembled similar processes across the world during the 2013–2016 EVD 
epidemic. Public health concerns provided an outlet for rabid anti-immi-
grant sentiments. A group of Italian doctors wrote a letter to the Italian 
authorities describing African migrants as EVD “Trojan horses” (Lac-
cino 2014a). In Rome, a woman from Guinea was attacked on a bus by 
people who accused her of spreading EVD (Laccino 2014b). In Dallas, 
Texas, where a Liberian fell sick with EVD and infected the caregivers, 
people called for all Liberian migrants to return “home” (Smith 2014). A 
Senegalese boy in New York was beaten by schoolmates who accused 
him of spreading Ebola (Nwoye 2014).  
28  Interview with a Senegalo-Guinean in Pikine, Dakar, 25 February 2016. 
29  Interviews with Senegalo-Guineans in Medina Gounass, Guediawaye, Dakar, 
24 March 2016; in Thiaroye Gare, Dakar, 26 March 2016; and in Guediawaye, 
Dakar, 28 March 2016.  
30  Interviews with Senegalo-Guineans in Pikine Lansar, Dakar, 23 March 2016 
and in Mousdaliga, Pikine, Dakar, 14 March 2016. 
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The demonisation of migrant populations as epidemic dangers has a 
rich and troubled history that goes beyond the 2014 EVD outbreak. The 
outbreak of the SARS virus was the occasion for the stigmatisation and 
vilification of Chinese migrants and members of the Chinese diaspora in 
New York’s Chinatown (Eichelberger 2007). The avian flu, MERS, and 
HIV outbreaks were all occasions for such boundary making. In the 
United States, the entry of migrants has historically been the occasion for 
multiple health checks to keep out dangerous foreigners (Crawford 1994; 
Bashford 2002; Harper and Raman 2008; White 2010; Mason 2012; 
Gilles et al 2013). These checks have over time included tests for sexually 
transmitted diseases, parasitic infections, mental illnesses, and physical 
disabilities (Markel and Stern 2002). 
The view of migrants as epidemic dangers ties in with their por-
trayal as people fuelling wars, destroying the environment, depriving 
locals of jobs, and eroding the morals of host communities (Whitaker 
2002; Salehyan 2008; Onoma 2013).  
Conclusion 
This article exposes temporal continuities in social life by revealing how 
reactions in Senegal to the EVD outbreak were shaped by histories of 
inter-communal contestation over rights, privileges, and responsibilities. It 
also reveals continuities across “sectors” by showing how what happened 
in the health “sector” was influenced by wider social interactions. Epi-
demics are constituted by broader social realities and can only be under-
stood when looked at against these wider processes. The tendency to look 
at contagious epidemics as temporarily bounded medical phenomena, 
which is encouraged by the trauma that they cause, has to be resisted.  
Detailed work on the reactions of the Peul-Fouta community to the 
EVD crisis demonstrates how age-old stereotypes about certain popula-
tions obfuscate the evolution of epidemics. Migrant communities are 
sometimes even more concerned about the dangers of epidemics than 
“autochthonous” populations. Further, the measures they take can 
sometimes conform more with the recommendations of public health 
agencies than those taken by local populations.  
There are a few policy implications that flow from this work. First, 
the concentration of funds and human resources on “dangerous” migrant 
populations during epidemics diverts valuable resources from more im-
portant uses. These groups are sometimes no more deserving of policing 
during these epidemics than the general populace. Second, the preoccu-
pation of migrant communities whose places of origin are badly affected 
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by contagious epidemics with epidemic control and prevention make them 
natural allies of public health officials. State and non-state public health 
officials should support these groups’ epidemic control and prevention 
measures. Such support could include the provision of materials for epi-
demic control. 
Officials should also seek the help of these groups to discourage un-
necessary movement and monitor the health of those who do move dur-
ing epidemics. Migrants who host people from their places of origin enjoy 
significant influence over these guests. This makes migrants particularly 
efficacious at influencing the decisions of people from their home areas 
concerning travel and the seeking of medical attention during trips. Mes-
sages sent out by these migrants will be far more effective than general 
messages put out by state and non-state officials. By playing the role of 
hosts, migrants also acquire significant information on visiting guests that 
can be useful to epidemic control and prevention officials (Onoma 2016).  
The possibility of such collaboration hinges significantly on trust 
between migrant communities and health officials. These relations of 
trust are often determined by long histories of state–society relations that 
go well beyond the health sector and the epidemic being countered. 
Given their roots in violent and highly exploitative colonial regimes, 
African states do not always enjoy the trust of their societies. This tinges 
how people relate with state officials and non-state officials, who may be 
deemed to be collaborating with the state. This lack of trust was high-
lighted as one of the main impediments to effective epidemic control 
and prevention during the EVD outbreak in the Mano River Basin 
(Onoma 2016). This means that modes of governance and interactions 
with society that increase the legitimacy of the state will over the long 
run be beneficial for epidemic control and prevention.  
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Wie Risikogruppen gemacht werden: die “Peul-Fouta”  
und die Angst vor Ebola im Senegal 
Zusammenfassung: Um Epidemien einzudämmen, werden vielfach 
einzelne soziale Gruppen als “Risikogruppe” definiert. Ihnen wird ein 
hohes Gefährdungspotential zugeschrieben, zur weiteren Verbreitung der 
Infektion in der Bevölkerung beizutragen. Potentielle Kontakte von Mi-
granten zu Erkrankten in ihrer Herkunftsregion, die von der Infektion 
stark betroffen ist, scheinen deren Bewertung als Infektionsrisiko für die 
Bevölkerung am Wohnort zu rechtfertigen. Doch der Definition sozialer 
Gruppen als Gesundheitsrisiko liegen immer andere, schon lange existie-
rende Narrative über die betreffende Bevölkerungsgruppe zugrunde. In 
diesen Narrativen unterscheiden sich die Mitglieder der Gruppe erheblich 
von der Gesellschaft insgesamt und werden in vielfältiger Weise stigmati-
siert. Die Lage der aus Guinea stammenden Peul im Senegal auf dem Hö-
hepunkt des Ebola-Ausbruchs im Mano River Basin wirft ein Licht auf 
solche soziogenetischen Prozesse und ihre Implikationen für die Kontrolle 
und Prävention von Epidemien. 
Schlagwörter: Senegal, Einwanderung/Einwanderer, Peul, Soziale Diskri-
minierung, Fremdenfeindlichkeit, Ebola-Virus 
